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Shleifer and Vishny(1997) 
[1]
pointed out that the conflict between large and small 
shareholders has become one company’s main company principal-agent problem 
under the centralized equity structure .The “only one big share” phenomenon is 
commonly existed in China. In order to maximize their private benefits, large 
shareholders who have strong control over the company would take measures to 
misappropriate small shareholders’ interests, which tunneling is the most common and 
influential way they would use. As the so-called tunneling is fiercer than a tiger, it not 
only causes damages to the interests of small shareholders, but also brings adverse 
economic consequences to the listed company, leading to the financial distress or the 
delisting crisis of the company. Furthermore, the large shareholders control the 
company’s accounting information through earnings management for the purpose of 
delaying the adverse economic consequences and whitewashing their occupation 
behavior. With the earnings management under the control of large shareholders, they 
continually obtain private benefits from the listed company, while concealing their 
occupation behavior at the same time.  
Based on the agency theory and the information asymmetry theory, this paper 
mainly studied about the correlation between large shareholder tunneling and earnings 
management. The sample data of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 
2014 with 14177 dates in total is utilized in the analysis. The results indicated that 
there existed a noteworthy positive correlation between the large shareholder 
tunneling and earnings management. According to the analysis result of different 
equity natures, the positive correlation between the large shareholder tunneling and 
earnings management would be significantly weakened in the state-owner company 
compared with the non-state-owned listed company. Moreover, when taking the 
institutional environment variable into consideration, the positive correlation would 
be significantly weakened if the listed company was located in the high-level 
institutional environment area, validating that the institutional environment has played 















evidence in the field of the correlation between the large shareholder tunneling and 
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心。与一系列整治措施相配合，上交所和深交所在 2006 年 6 月 1 日首次公开通告了
大股东违规占用上市公司资金的情况，公布资金占用总额高达 339.73 亿元，其中资
金占用达到 1 亿元以上的上市公司有 84 家。经过监管部门多年整治，大股东资金占
用的情况已有所缓和，但仍然有相当一部分上市公司存在着隐秘性的大股东资金占
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在于大多数国家中，股权集中化才是公司股权结构的主流形态。La Porta et al.（1999）
[4]以 27 个高收入国家的企业为样本进行股权结构研究，结果显示样本中 65%的上市
公司都存在股权集中的情况。他们还发现大股东往往会以金字塔形式控股进而导致
投票权大于现金流权，这成为大股东侵占中小股东权益的症结所在。在新兴的发展
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